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The  spectacular,  sustained  economic  growth  experienced  in  several  East  Asian 
countries leads to the question what Europe can learn from the East Asian economic 
model. Three advantages of the East Asian model stand out: small social transfers, low 
taxation and free labor markets. The superiority of such policies is now widely accepted, 
and the question is how they can be emulated by Europe. Traditionally, the EU has 
taken  a  top-down  approach  to  decision  making  and  policy  implementation,  which  is 
characteristic of the Lisbon Agenda, which has not made much progress. However, after 
the powers of the European Commission have been weakened in the last few years 
competition  between  national  governments  has  spurred  swift  tax  cuts  and  faster 
deregulation of labor markets.  Bottom-up reforms arising from competition should be 
more readily accepted in the EU. 
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During the last three-four decades, the East Asian model has emerged as seemingly 
superior to the West European model through persistently higher economic growth rates and 
broad social development.
c For a long time, the high East Asian growth rates were perceived as 
merely a matter of catching-up from a low base. As the East Asians were creeping closer to the 
EU countries in GDP per capita, the East Asian model was taken more seriously, but so far only 
Hong  Kong  has  just  about  overtaken  the  EU  average  GDP  per  capita  in  purchasing  power 
parities. 
The “East Asian miracle” started out as the single Japanese miracle after World War II, 
but the Japanese growth faded around 1990, and it is a separate story. The next impressive 
growth story was the four East Asian “tigers,” Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea, 
which took off in the early 1960s. Later on, the East Asian high-growth group broadened, and we 
shall discuss the six most developed East Asian countries: South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Taiwan, Malaysia, and Thailand. All these countries have reached such a GDP per capita that 
they  are  no  longer  developing  countries,  and  they  all  represent  the  East  Asia  model  as 
discussed  below.  In  its  original  study  The  East  Asian  Miracle,  the  World  Bank  (1993)  also 
included  Indonesia  and  the  Philippines  among  eight  “high-performing  Asian  economies,”  but 
they remain far poorer and are less relevant for a comparison with Europe. China has produced 
high economic growth since its reform start in 1978, but it, as well as Indo-China, remains very 
poor. China and Indo-China are also systemically peculiar as only partially reformed communist 
economies. Besides, China is so big that statistically it would drown all the other countries. The 
EU of comparison is the EU of 15 countries from 1995 until 2004, as these countries define the 
EU model.  
The first section establishes what the East Asian model actually amounts to and how it 
compares with the EU model. In the second section, we summarize main idea of the discussion 
of the East Asian model after the Asian financial crisis in 1997/98. The third section considers 
how the EU model could be altered so that it would be able to adopt the desirable features of the 
East Asian model. 
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1. Characteristics of the East Asian Model 
 
The reason that made the World Bank single out the East Asian economies was that they 
had  maintained  rapid,  sustained  economic  growth  of  5.5  percent  a  year  between  1960  and 
1990. The World Bank (1993, p. 8) emphasized that what distinguished these economies from 
other developing economies was their high investment rates, including unusually high rates of 
private investment, and high and rising endowments of human capital due to universal primary 
and secondary education. These factors were assessed to account for roughly two-thirds of the 
growth in these countries, while the remainder was attributable to improved productivity. 
Over  time,  East  Asian  growth  rates  have  slowed  down  somewhat. The  (unweighted) 
average annual growth rate in the decade 1996-2005 was 4.3 percent in the six East Asian 
countries  to  compare  with  3.0  percent  in  the  EU-15.  If  the  growth  rate  of  the  EU-15  were 
weighted it would decline about one percentage unit to 2 percent a year. The difference might 
not appear impressive, especially as the average GDP per capita in purchasing power parities in 
East Asia was $21,600 to compare with $33,000 in the EU-15 in 2005 (see Table 1). However, 
the East Asian numbers in this period were reduced by the t devastating effects of the 1997-
1998  East  Asian  currency  and  financial  crises.  The  difference  is  not  conspicuous  but  still 
significant. It can hardly be explained merely by a laggard effect of economically more backward 
countries growing faster, if they pursue the same economic policies as already richer countries. 
 
Table 1. GDP in East Asia and EU-15 
 
  
GDP, % growth, 
1996-2005 
GDP per capita, 
PPP, 2005 
East Asia     
Hong Kong  3.9  33 479 
Korea  4.5  20 590 
Malaysia  4.8  11 201 
Singapore  5.2  28 368 
Taiwan  4.5  27 721 
Thailand  2.8  8 368 
Average  4.3  21 621 
EU-15     
Austria  2.2  33 896 
Belgium  2.1  32 524 Studies & Analyses CASE No. 338 – How Can the EU Emulate the Positive Features of the…  
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GDP, % growth, 
1996-2005 
GDP per capita, 
PPP, 2005 
Denmark  2.1  34 367 
Finland  3.6  31 367 
France  2.2  30 104 
Germany  1.3  30 253 
Greece  3.9  22 691 
Ireland  7.5  38 075 
Italy  1.3  28 396 
Luxembourg  4.6  68 681 
Netherlands  2.6  34 359 
Portugal  2.4  19 707 
Spain  3.7  27 284 
Sweden  2.8  31 691 
United Kingdom  2.8  32 265 
Average  3.0  33 044 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators database (2007);  
IMF World Economic Outlook database, September 2006 
 
How has East Asia been able to achieve the high growth rates and rates of investment in 
both physical and human capital and what can other countries learn from this experience? This 
is the key question asked by the World Bank (1993), which has become the standard source 
describing the key elements of the “East Asian model.” East Asia is quite a varied region with 
regard to history, culture, and economy. Public policy in East Asian countries has also been far 
from homogenous, but some key elements have been more or less common.
d 
 
•  Conservative  macroeconomic  policy.  All  countries  have  long  adhered  to  “sound 
fundamentals” - maintaining low budget deficits, inflation, and low current account deficits 
– which has created a stable business environment and encouraged high savings and 
investment rates. Over the last five years, inflation in the region averaged 2.3 percent 
and  current  account  and  government  budget  were  in  surplus  of  9.0  percent  and  0.4 
percent of GDP, respectively (see Table 2). These sound monetary and fiscal policies 
distinguish  East  Asian  countries  from  other  developing  countries  and  even  many 
developed countries. The advantages of “getting the basics right” remain unchallenged 
even while many other recipes for growth have gone out of fashion.  
 
Since  the  adoption  of  the  Maastricht  criteria,  the  EU  has  also  pursued  quite  a 
conservative macroeconomic policy. The average budget deficit from 2000 to 2005 was 
                                                 
d The summary below draws on World Bank (1993) and Stiglitz and Yusuf (2001). Studies & Analyses CASE No. 338 – How Can the EU Emulate the Positive Features of the…  
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tiny – 0.8 percent of GDP, and inflation has lingered around 2.2 percent, even better than 
East Asia’s (see Table 2). The explanation of the lower inflation in the EU is that the East 
Asians have maintained undervalued exchange rates by buying up large international 
currency reserves, while the EU has focused on combating inflation, which has been 
facilitated by the common European Central Bank. The EU does not appear to have 
much to learn from the East Asians with regard to macroeconomic policies. 
 
Table 2. Stabilization Indicators in East Asia and EU-15 
 
    
Budget 











East Asia       
Hong Kong  -2.2  0.9  9.0 
Korea  1.9  2.7  2.2 
Malaysia  -  3  11.4 
Singapore  5.7  0.5  20.9 
Taiwan  -3.9  2.3  7.0 
Thailand  -1.4  4.5  3.7 
Average  0.4  2.3  9.0 
EU-15       
Austria  -1.2  2.3  -0.1 
Belgium  0.2  2.8  3.6 
Denmark  1.5  1.8  2.8 
Finland  3.8  0.9  7.6 
France  -2.9  1.7  0.2 
Germany  -2.7  2  2.3 
Greece  -5.4  3.5  -7.2 
Ireland  1.2  2.4  -1.0 
Italy  -2.9  2  -0.9 
Luxembourg  1.8  2.5  9.3 
Netherlands  -0.9  1.7  5.1 
Portugal  -4.7  2.3  -8.0 
Spain  -0.1  3.4  -4.7 
Sweden  1.6  0.5  5.9 
United 
Kingdom  -1.5  2.8  -1.8 
Average  -0.8  2.2  0.9 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators database (2007);  
IMF World Economic Outlook database, September 2006;  
UN Economic Commission for Europe database (2007) 
 
•  Economic  freedom.  Overall  economic  freedom  has  actually  not  been  much  of  an 
argument,  and  curiously  economic  freedom  in  East  Asia  and  the  EU-15  is  almost Studies & Analyses CASE No. 338 – How Can the EU Emulate the Positive Features of the…  
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identical and among the highest in the world, with East Asia slightly ahead of the EU-15 
(see Chart 1). Prices and trade have been free.  







































Source: Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal 2007 Index Of Economic 
Freedom.  
•  Export orientation. Export orientation is generally considered to have been the “engine of 
growth” in East Asia. The state provided strong incentives for successful exporters via 
subsidies  and  favorable  credit  terms.  It  also  maintained  competitive  exchange  rates, 
which contributed to domestic companies’ export success. Because domestic markets 
are relatively small in the majority of the countries, export markets have been crucial to 
achieving  efficient  production  scales.  By  maintaining  open  markets  and  by  exposing 
domestic industries to foreign technology and foreign competition, these countries have 
been able to achieve rapid rate of technological progress, which was critical for their 
economic growth. Disagreement over the subject of efficacy of exports in generating high 
growth rates centers on the question of causality. Some countries, such as South Korea 
and Taiwan were not particularly open in 1960s and maintained significant protective 
tariffs  and  import  substitution  policies.  High  degree  of  openness  in  these  countries 
evolved only gradually, accompanying rather than preceding the process of economic 
growth. Over time, freer trade has won out.    
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Europe  has  an  old  and  proud  tradition  of  free  trade  and  open  markets.  One  of  the 
greatest achievements of the European Union is the single market. In this regard, East 
Asia has essentially followed Europe’s successful lead. East Asia is still lagging behind in 
terms of freedom of trade but not much. 













East Asia       
Hong Kong  22  14 
Korea  -  30 
Malaysia  21  12 
Singapore  15  20 
Taiwan  -  - 
Thailand  17  29 
Average  19  21 
EU-15       
Austria  50  51 
Belgium  50  45 
Denmark  53  63 
Finland  50  43 
France  54  52 
Germany  47  50 
Greece  47  48 
Ireland  34  45 
Italy  48  - 
Luxembourg  43  45 
Netherlands  45  48 
Portugal  48  53 
Spain  38  60 
Sweden  56  53 
United 
Kingdom  45  53 
Average  47  51 
Source: Eurostat; IMF World Economic Outlook database, September 2006;  
IMF Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 2005;  
World Bank Doing Business database 2006 
 
•  Small social transfers. Low public expenditures on social transfers are hallmarks of East 
Asian economies. In this sphere, the difference between East Asia and Europe is huge. 
In 2005, total public expenditures in East Asia amounted to some 19 percent of GDP to 
compare with 47 percent of GDP in the EU-15 (see Table 3). Almost all the additional Studies & Analyses CASE No. 338 – How Can the EU Emulate the Positive Features of the…  
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public expenditures in Europe are devoted to social transfers. The difference in policy on 
social transfers stands out as one of the most important qualitative contrasts between the 
two models. 
 
•  Low Taxes. A natural consequence of the limited costs of social security in East Asian is 
that taxes can also be kept relatively low. By all measures, East Asian taxes are far lower 
than in Europe, whether considering personal income taxes, corporate profit taxes or 
consumption taxes. One of the easiest and most relevant measures is corporate profit 
taxes. According to the World Bank study Doing Business, the average corporate profit 
tax as a share of gross profits of businesses is 21 percent in East Asia to compare with 
51 percent in the EU-15, that is, about two and a half times higher (see Table 3).
e The 
lower taxes should contribute to higher growth rates than the European welfare state 
model.  
 
•  Free  labor markets.  The  conventional  view  holds  that  little  state  intervention  in  labor 
markets has significantly contributed to high growth rates in East Asia. According to the 
World  Bank  study,  “in  East  Asia,  more  than  elsewhere,  governments  resisted  the 
temptation to intervene in the labor market” (1993, p. 266). Since wages flexibly adjusted 
to the demand for labor, East Asian economies have been able to adjust to changing 
economic  conditions  more  quickly  and  less  painfully,  maintaining  high  employment 
levels. In 2005, when the whole world was booming, the average unemployment rate 
was  4.7  percent  in  East  Asia,  which  appears  a  reasonable  approximation  of  full 
employment, to compare with 7.1 percent in the EU-15 (see Table 4).
f Moreover, the 
difference in the rigidity of the labor markets is great with the European labor markets 
being about twice as rigid, or over-regulated, as the East Asian markets. 
 
•  Strong education. A persistent and common feature of all the East Asian countries has 
been a strong tendency to invest in both public and private education. In recent PISA 
comparisons of education by the OECD in various developed countries, the East Asian 
countries regularly cram the top of the tables with the qualitatively best education. It is a 
great challenge for Europe to catch up with them, though Finland has already succeeded 
                                                 
e Admittedly, the real tax rates are difficult to compare because the tax bases and deductions are defined differently 
even within Europe, leading to disparate measurements. The overall point, however, that the profit taxes are far 
higher in Europe is indisputable. 
f The figure is comparatively low because we used an unweighted average, considering that most big European 
countries have more unemployment than the small countries. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 338 – How Can the EU Emulate the Positive Features of the…  
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in beating most of them. Clearly, the disparity among EU countries is great, and this is 
and will remain a sphere of national policy among the EU countries. 











East Asia       
Hong Kong  5.7  0 
Korea  3.7  34 
Malaysia  4
g  10 
Singapore  3.1  0 
Taiwan  4.1  56 
Thailand  2e  18 
Average  4.7  20 
EU-15       
Austria  5.2  37 
Belgium  8.4  20 
Denmark  4.8  17 
Finland  8.4  48 
France  9.5  56 
Germany  9.5  44 
Greece  9.8  58 
Ireland  4.3  33 
Italy  7.7  54 
Luxembourg  4.5  - 
Netherlands  4.8  42 
Portugal  7.6  51 
Spain  9.2  63 
Sweden  7.8  43 
United 
Kingdom  4.7  14 
Average  7.1  41 
Source: World Bank World Development Indicators database (2007);  
IMF World Economic Outlook database, September 2006;  
UN Economic Commission for Europe database (2007);  
World Bank Doing Business database 2006 
 
 
•  Income  inequality.  The  World  Bank  labeled  East  Asia  as  “rapid  growth  with  equity.” 
Despite low social transfers, East Asian countries have moderate income inequality. High 
GDP growth rates have led to development of large middle class, and absolute poverty 
rates have declined sharply. As measured in Gini coefficients, East Asia is significantly 
                                                 
e. 2004 data. Studies & Analyses CASE No. 338 – How Can the EU Emulate the Positive Features of the…  
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less egalitarian than Western Europe, but it slightly less so than the United States, which 
had Gini index of 44 in 2005 (see Chart 2).  
 






























Source: World Bank World Development Indicators database (2007)
 
 
•  Substantial state intervention. A very centralized economic decision making power also 
characterizes many East Asian economies. Among the countries under consideration, 
the  most  highly  interventionist  state  strategies  were  followed  by  South  Korea  and 
Taiwan, while Hong Kong and Thailand were mostly non-interventionist. As the World 
Bank report summarizes, policy intervention took many forms: 
 
Targeting and subsidizing credit to selected industries, keeping deposit rates low 
and  maintaining  ceilings  on  borrowing  rates  to  increase  profits  and  retained 
earnings, protecting domestic import substitutes, subsidizing declining industries, 
establishing  and  financially  supporting  government  banks,  making  public 
investments in applied research, establishing firm- and industry-specific export 
targets, developing export marketing institutions, and sharing information widely 
between public and private sectors (World Bank 1993, p. 5). Studies & Analyses CASE No. 338 – How Can the EU Emulate the Positive Features of the…  
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The  governments  of South Korea  and Taiwan  actively  supported the  development  of 
specific sectors, especially heavy industry and high-tech sectors. Their industrial policy 
involved  active  promotion  of  research  and  development  through  direct  and  indirect 
subsidies,  and  the  less  justifiable  policies  that  allocated  credit  to  preferred  sectors, 
projects,  and  firms. Whether  industrial  policy  was  a major  source  of  growth  in  these 
economies remains in question.  
 
The EU hardly needs to learn anything from East Asia with regard to state intervention. If 
anything  this  has  been  a  negative  feature  in  the  standard  East  Asian  model  which 
strangely has not cost all too much in terms of economic growth. A broad consensus in 
the economic growth literature now sees state intervention as a negative influence (Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin 2004). 
 
•  Tolerance toward corruption. Corruption varies greatly in the region. As measured by the 
Transparency International corruption perceptions index, Singapore persistently ranks as 
one of the most transparent countries in the world, but most of the others are somewhat 
more corrupt than the EU countries, making the group somewhat more corrupt than the 
EU-15  (see  Chart  3;  Transparency  International,  2006).  The  special  government  and 
business relations in East Asia that have been celebrated once as one of the causes of 
high growth have been denounced as “crony capitalism” after the crisis and blamed for 
the severity of economic downturn that struck these counties. Multi-country regression 
analysis has firmly established that corruption is bad for economic growth (Mauro, 1995). 
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Source: Transparency International (2006)
 
 
•  Mild  authoritarianism.  Another  part  of  the  “Asian  development  model”  is  a  strong 
bureaucracy able to achieve the developmental goals of the state. This “strong state” in 
the East Asian context frequently means an authoritarian, centralized state. According to 
the report recently released by the Freedom House (2007; see Chart 4), the region saw 
little change  over the last  year  with majority  of  the countries  remaining  partially free. 
Thailand was even downgraded from “partly free” to “not free” in the last year. 
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Source: Freedom House (2006)
 
 
Evidently, the East Asian model is no panacea in comparison with the EU model, but it has a 
strong record of higher economic growth, based on higher investment in physical and human 
capital  as  well  as  productivity  growth.  In  several  regards,  the  two  models  are  very  similar, 
namely  they  both  pursue  conservative  macroeconomic  policies,  maintain  great  economic 
freedom, and free trade. In three important regards, the East Asian model appears to have clear 
advantages over the EU model: smaller social transfers, lower taxes, and freer labor markets. As 
a consequence, income differentials are somewhat greater in East Asia, which has also some 
rather unattractive features: substantial state intervention, somewhat high corruption, and mild 
authoritarianism. 
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2. Discussion of the East Asian Model 
 
The East Asian model has provoked an extensive debate. Partly, it has been concerned 
with how large the quantitative effects have been of its different features. This debate has then 
been followed by an ideological, interpretive debate on what conclusions to draw.  
In 1994, Paul Krugman (1994) initiated an animated debate about the East Asian model, 
claiming that growth in the region was not sustainable because it was primarily based on factor 
accumulation – eventually subject to diminishing returns, rather than productivity growth. The 
East Asian “miracle” was not caused by a superior economic system but only great savings. 
Krugman argued that total factor productivity made a negligible contribution to growth in much of 
industrializing East Asia. His interpretation appeared prophetic as it was presented before the 
financial  crises  of  1997-98,  which  indicated  that  East  Asia  had  over-invested.  According  to 
Krugman  (1997,  p.  27),  the  Asian  growth  was  “mainly  a  matter  of  perspiration  rather  than 
inspiration – of growing harder not smarter.”  
Several econometric papers were written in response to Krugman’s assertions (notably, 
Collins et al., 1996; Iwata et al., 2003; Ito and Krueger, 1995; Ito and Rose, 2004). Iwata, Khan 
and Murao (2003) provided a late and convincing econometric analysis. They found that Hong 
Kong,  South  Korea,  Singapore,  and Taiwan,  the  original  Asian  tigers,  had  very  similar  total 
factor  productivity  growth  of  3.4-3.9  percent  over  the  long  period  1960-95,  and  total  factor 
productivity  accounted  for  no  less  than  44-47  percent  of  the  output  growth  of  each  country 
during that period. Capital accumulation, by contrast, contributed only 25-28 percent of their 
output growth. Besides, something in their economic model apparently made East Asians save 
and invest more, which appears a good thing in itself. East Asia’s great investment in human 
capital is even more obviously positive. 
The East Asian model dawned upon the world as a miracle when the former Soviet Bloc 
was undergoing its transition. Leftwingers and rightwingers picked and chose what they liked in 
the  East  Asian  model  and  emphasized  that  they  were  the  cause  of  the  success,  and  they 
naturally chose opposing elements in line with their ideological preferences. What leftwingers 
particularly liked about the East Asian model was the state intervention. Its soft form of dirigisme 
appeared to work. A dominant idea was that the state could and should try to pick industrial 
“winners,” but the roles suggested for the state were rather limited. Although a certain tolerance Studies & Analyses CASE No. 338 – How Can the EU Emulate the Positive Features of the…  
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for state ownership was suggested, nobody really advocated more state ownership (Amsden et 
al., 1994; Aoki et al., 1996; Stiglitz, 1996). Some even went so far as to advocate tolerance of 
corruption (Amsden et al., 1994). 
Jeffrey Sachs (1996) took the opposite rightwing point of view. He stated that the role of 
the  state  was  exaggerated  and  particularly  its  positive  impact.  Looking  upon  East-Central 
Europe, he argued: “Perhaps the greatest economic challenge in the medium term will be to 
reduce the scope and ambition of the social welfare state, both to ease chronic fiscal pressures, 
and to reduce the distortions caused by very high levels of labor taxation” (p. 55). Other authors, 
e.g.  Ari  Kokko  (2002)  praised  the  trade  liberalization  of  the  East  Asian  countries,  while  he 
singled out the selective large-scale export promotion and the unsuccessful attempts to “pick 
winners” as particularly unsuccessful policies. The liberal view of the East Asian experience was 
that its three big lessons were to keep public social transfers low, taxes low and reasonably flat, 
and labor markets free, while excessive state intervention, especially to the benefit of the very 
large companies, remained a serious problem, which bred corruption and hampered economic 
growth. 
The  East  Asian  currency  and  financial  crises  of  1997-98  radically  transformed  the 
international opinion about the East Asian experiences.
h It tested the many hypotheses of the 
ground for the East Asian miracle. A sense spread that something was profoundly wrong with 
this model. The view brought to fore by Krugman (1994), that growth was increasingly driven by 
increasing factor inputs rather than increased total factor productivity, was reinforced. Two major 
conclusions were drawn. 
First, an obvious shortfall was pegged exchange rates at unrealistic levels, which had 
little to do with the model as such (Stiglitz and Yusuf, 2001, pp. 8-10). The East Asian countries 
adjusted their exchange rate policies. Formally, they have more or less floating exchange rates, 
but, in effect, they manipulate their exchange rates downwards by purchasing huge international 
reserves. Their fiscal policies became even more conservative. Leftwingers focused on what 
they considered premature financial liberalization, which had been advocated by the IMF (Stiglitz 
2002). Both the left and the right criticized the IMF for excessive intervention after the crisis had 
erupted. The change of exchange rate policy did not have any real ideological consequences. 
Second,  the  benefits  of  industrial  policy  with  directed  credits  and  subsidies  were 
seriously  challenged.  This  ran  against  the  arguments  of  particularly  Alice  Amsden  (1989; 
Amsden et al., 1994), who had cherished South Korea’s state interventions. More broadly, the 
opaque governance system of both state and big corporations was questioned. The right saw 
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“crony  capitalism,”  the  corrupt  intertwining  of  large  business  and  government,  as  the  main 
problem (Krueger 2002). In this regard, the right won a major victory. 
A large number of other arguments were raised that were soon forgotten, because soon 
the crisis turned out to have been much less profound as first appeared to be the case, with 
Indonesia being a partial exception. These countries’ economic models changed little, though 
their  capitalisms  became  slightly  less  crony.  Robert  Barro  (2001)  concluded  that  a  sharp 
reduction  of  economic  growth  had  occurred,  especially  in  the  five  countries  directly  hit 
(Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand). In particular, their investment 
rates were reduced. Still, in his broader analysis he found no evidence that financial crises had 
effects on growth that persisted beyond a five-year period. At present, the East Asian model 
looks almost as attractive as before the crisis, although growth rates have faded somewhat. It 
has  become  significantly  more  capitalist  (Gill  and  Kharas,  2006).  The  leftwing  case  for  the 
success of the East Asian model most strongly made by Alice Amsden (1989) for South Korea is 
quite difficult to maintain today. 
 
 
3. Adaptation and Reform of the EU 
 
Today,  it  appears  evident  what  the  EU  should  do.  It  needs  to  emulate  the  three 
fundamental advantages of the East Asian model:  
1. lower social transfers,  
2. lower taxes, and  
3. freer labor markets. 
 
        The assumption is that lower public transfers offer people greater incentives to save for 
their own social security, and lower taxes increase their possibilities to do so. Lower taxes also 
offer people better incentives to invest in their human capital through education. A deregulation 
of labor markets will improve the allocation of labor and reduce unemployment, and thus reduce 
the  need  for  social  transfers  to  the  unemployed.  A  broad  consensus  has  evolved  among 
economists that these steps are necessary for Europe’s future. The question today is how the 
EU model can most easily adjust to these three requirements, that is, how the economically vital 
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       In  principle,  two  competing  approaches  exist,  top-down  or  bottom-up  change. 
Traditionally, Europe has been a disorderly and decentralized place, where each country has 
gone its own way. The European Union changed that from its very outset. The essence of the 
Treaty of Rome is that the EU members get together and decide unanimously what the Union as 
a  whole  should  do.  That  is,  the  Rome  Treaty  introduced  a  top-down  approach  that  was 
previously  alien  to  Europe  as  a  region.  All  joint  EU  decisions,  including  the  whole  acquis 
communautaire and the Lisbon Agenda, belong to this category. Strangely, this top-down mode 
of  action  has  been  taken  for  granted  for  long.  The  sources  of  inspiration  were  many.  The 
fundamental EU idea – no more war! – suggested that all countries should get together and 
agree. Another inspiration was of course the ideas of central planning and social engineering so  
prevalent after World War II. The soft version of central planning is international harmonization 
and standardization. Even when the EU has advocated deregulation of various markets it has 
done so in a centralized fashion rather than in a competitive manner. 
       The EU mode of operation and its decision-making mechanism are now under scrutiny, 
especially after the referendums on the European Constitutional Treaty in the summer of 2005 in 
France and the Netherlands rejected the Treaty. Another reason for disappointment with the EU 
top-down approach is that the Lisbon Agenda seems just about dead. Although the EU had 
solemnly declared clear quantitative targets, little action was taken to reach these goals (Gros 
2007). A third concern is that the acquis communautaire functions as a conserving force. One 
rule after the other is added to the acquis, but it appears close to impossible to deduct anything 
from it. As a result, the EU is becoming petrified and overregulated. Finally, time and again, 
leaders of European countries complain about “tax dumping” and “wage dumping,” appealing to 
common EU policy to stop more liberal countries to pursue competitive policies. The old EU 
model  appears  to  have  failed  in  practice,  and  it  offers  the  wrong  incentives.  Rather  than 
facilitating necessary reforms, it impedes them. 
To contemporary Europeans, the centralized EU model is seen as the way things are 
done in Europe. Naturally, the tremendous economic progress after World War II reinforces the 
European sense of having seen the light through the formation of the EU. Although this is true in 
general, it does not mean that the current EU model is perfect, as is evident from its inability to 
adopt the mentioned desirable reforms. 
Economic historians with a longer perspective present a very different European model 
(Rosenberg and Birdzell, 1986; Landes, 1998). One of the clearest points of view has been put 
forward by David Landes in his discussion of “European Exceptionalism” from the middle ages. 
Landes argues that the strength of Europe lay in fragmentation:  Studies & Analyses CASE No. 338 – How Can the EU Emulate the Positive Features of the…  
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•  Fragmentation gave rise to competition, and competition favored good   
      care of good subjects. Treat them badly, and they might go elsewhere (p. 36). 
 
•  Ironically, then, Europe’s great good fortune lay in the fall of Rome and the weakness 
and division that ensued (p. 37). 
 
•  The economic expansion of medieval Europe was thus promoted by a succession of 
organizational  innovations  and  adaptations,  most  of  them  initiated  from  below  and 
diffused by example. The rulers, even local seigneurs, scrambled to keep pace, to show 
themselves hospitable, to make labor available, to attract enterprise and the revenues it 
generated (p. 44). 
 
In fact, it appears as if this traditional European approach of competitive evolution, which 
has been the hallmark of Europe throughout the centuries, has come to the fore after the failure 
of  the  constitutional  referendums.  The  most  obvious  example  is  the  tax  competition  that  is 
spreading from the East. It started in 1994 in Estonia with a 26 percent flat personal income tax 
(now 24 percent), and ever lower flat income taxes have proliferated to Lithuania (33 percent in 
1994, now 30 percent to be reduced to 24 percent in 2008), Latvia (25 percent since 1997), 
Russia (13 percent since 2001), Ukraine (13 percent in 2004), Slovakia (19 percent in 2004), 
Georgia (12 percent in 2005), Romania (16 percent in 2005), and Kyrgyzstan (10 percent in 
2006). In spite of predictions to the contrary, the flat personal income taxes are continuing to 
spread (Keen et al., 2006). Needless to say, liberal migration rules within Europe will further 
sharpen tax competition. 
Tax competition is naturally even more evident for corporate profit taxes, as capital is 
more mobile than labor. They have fallen from levels of 30-50 percent in East-Central Europe to 
currently 15-19 percent in most of East-Central Europe. In the last years, Europe stands out as 
the part of the continent where overall taxation has declined. 
Another  feature  characteristic  of  Europe  today  is  competitive  deregulation  of  goods, 
service, and labor markets. Some of this deregulation is inspired by the European Commission, 
but most of it is not. Examples are the very gradual deregulation of the labor markets that almost 
most  EU  countries  now  are  pursuing  (Lenain,  2007).  The  big  breakthrough  was  Margaret 
Thatcher’s  acrimonious  deregulation  in  the  1980s,  which  was  later  emulated  by  Ireland, Studies & Analyses CASE No. 338 – How Can the EU Emulate the Positive Features of the…  
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contributing to that country’s great economic success. Even if European deregulation is tardy 
and piecemeal, it is steady. 
As competitive tax cuts and deregulations have already got the upper hand in Europe, 
the policy issue is primarily to let it happen. The most fundamental question about Europe’s 
future might be whether tax competition will be allowed or not. If tax competition will be allowed, 
the overall tax pressure is likely to fall toward the lowest level, that is, from currently about half of 
GDP to barely one third of GDP, the level in Romania and Lithuania (EBRD, 2006). At present, 
tax  competition  is  allowed,  but  it  is  highly  controversial.  Especially,  German  and  French 
politicians have called for it being curtailed, while its champions are most of the new members, 
the  United  Kingdom,  Ireland,  and  Luxemburg.  In  2006,  German  Minister  of  Finance  Peer 
Steinbrück lashed out against Austria because its decision to cut corporate tax rates from 34 
percent to 25 percent: “In the case of Austria we are dealing not with a moderate position but a 
rather ambitious and aggressive attempt to get companies to come to Austria” (Parker, 2006).  
When  did  competition  become  bad?  Sensibly,  as  part  of  its  radical  market  reforms, 
Ireland  reduced  its  profit  tax  to  12.5  percent,  and  Estonia  has  abolished  it  altogether  as 
undesirable. The most intense tax competition is taking place within Switzerland, where most of 
the tax is determined by the cantons. Now, the European Commission wants to limit this tax 
competition that is even outside of its jurisdiction because the European Commission deems it 
“unfair,” which presumably is Eurocratese for competitive (Simonian, 2007). But European tax 
competition is strong and on the rise with the integration brought about by the single market. A 
sign of how far European tax competition has gone is that even France’s President Jacques 
Chirac, one of the greatest complainers about “fiscal dumping,” has proposed to slash France’s 
profit  tax  from  33  percent  to  20  percent  (Houlder,  2007).  Before  his  demise  even  German 
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, the other great enemy of “tax dumping” made a failed attempt to 
reduce the German federal profit tax by 6 percentage units. The EU needs to adjust to the most 
liberal model. No other decision is likely to be as important for the nature of the EU as whether 
tax competition remains permitted.  
   
 
4. Conclusions: Competition Revives Subsidiarity  
 
The hype about the East Asian miracle has abated, as not only its advantages but also 
drawbacks have become evident. But a consequence is that the prime advantages of the East Studies & Analyses CASE No. 338 – How Can the EU Emulate the Positive Features of the…  
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Asian model have become all the more obvious, namely low social transfers, low and relatively 
flat taxes, and free labor markets, leading to high investment in both physical and human capital 
and  high  economic  growth.  Hardly  anybody  praises  its  minor  remaining  crony  features  as 
benefits after the Asian financial crisis of 1997/98, notably state intervention, more corruption 
and less democracy. A broad consensus, as reflected in the Lisbon Agenda, agrees that the EU 
needs to emulate these three features of the East Asian model not to be left behind in near 
stagnation and ultimate decline.  
The question today is not if the EU needs to adopt these three liberal features of the 
Asian model, but how to do so most easily. The main idea of this paper is that the centralized 
mode of resolving problems within the EU, which has accomplished a great deal, has reached its 
limits.  What  Europe  needs  today  is  not  primarily  greater  ability  to  make  rational  top-down 
decisions  but  a  greater  acceptance  of  bottom-up  reforms  of  taxation,  social  transfers,  and 
deregulation,  based  on  Europe’s  traditional  comparative  advantage,  competition  among  the 
European countries  and  regions.  This means  that  tax  competition  should  be  welcomed  and 
facilitated. The same is true of regulatory competition, notably labor market deregulation, which 
will be greatly facilitated by freer movement of labor. 
We may attempt a concrete prediction as these changes are already under way. Since 
enterprises are easily relocating from one country to another, we could expect corporate profit 
taxes to rapidly fall toward the interval 10-20 percent of net profits. Labor is much less mobile, 
and a higher taxation of labor would be feasible. However, given the new trend to adopt flat 
income taxes in the range of 16-25 percent in several new EU members, personal taxation might 
go  through  a  radical  reduction  because  of  example  and  moral  imperative  rather  than  factor 
mobility. A natural consequence would be that the total burden of taxation declines from about 
half of GDP to one third of GDP, which appears a reasonable level (Tanzi and Schuknecht 
2000). With anticipated greater labor mobility within the EU, the need for Europeanization and 
harmonization  of  pension  rules  and  payroll  taxation  is  becoming  ever  greater,  which  would 
probably have to be done in the old top-down fashion. Evidently, because of fiscal constraints, 
the systems of social transfers have to adjust, which is likely to be done incrementally at a 
national level. Ever since Britain’s deregulation of its labor market in the 1980s, similar reforms 
have spread piecemeal through Europe. After they have proved both their economic and social 
efficacy, they are likely to proliferate further. 
The European Union has long cherished the principle of subsidiarity in theory. In reality, 
however,  the  rhetoric  has  suggested  that  everything  needs  to  be  done  top-down  by  the 
European Commission. The referendums of the summer of 2005 provided the EU establishment Studies & Analyses CASE No. 338 – How Can the EU Emulate the Positive Features of the…  
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a rude surprise. The productive outcome might be that subsidiarity becomes reality, and that the 
excessively  hierarchical  mode  of functioning of  the  European Union  becomes  supplemented 
with a healthy element of horizontal competition between countries and regions.   
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